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Abstract
We consider the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem in a dynamic,
stochastic environment when the government is sluggish in the sense that it
cannot change the tax rule as uncertainty resolves. We show that the sluggish
government cannot allow saving or borrowing regardless of the utility func-
tion. Moreover, we argue that the zero top marginal tax rate result in static
models is of little practical importance because it is actually relevant onlywhen
the top earner in the initial period receives the highest shock in every period.
JEL classification: H21
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1 Introduction
Since theNewDynamic Public Financewas inaugurated, progress has beenmade
in clarifying what the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax looks like. This
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agenda aims to extend the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), who studies optimal
income taxation in a static environment, to dynamic, stochastic environments.1
Dynamic tax rules are in eect dynamic contracts because taxpayers have private
information about their labor productivity, so the optimal dynamic income tax rule
is generally complicated: it is nonstationary anddepends on the entire history of in-
come declared for any taxpayer. However, it is questionable whether governments
can implement such complex tax rules because making tax rules time-dependent
and tracking histories of income would entail large administrative and compliance
costs. Indeed, neither of our governments (i.e., the US and Japanese governments)
is tracking histories for income taxation.
In view of this observation, we contribute to the New Dynamic Public Finance
literature by considering optimal dynamic income taxation when the government
cannot change the tax rule over time. That is, the government can use only station-
ary tax rules. Our interpretation is that we must restrict our attention to a simple
dynamic tax rule because our government is sluggish. Moreover, the stationarity
of tax rule implies that the tax cannot depend on histories of income. Indeed, the
sluggish government can look at only current incomes, just as it can only look at
current incomes in the initial period. Naturally, we also assume that the sluggish
government makes a full commitment to its tax systemwhich is a collection of each
period’s tax rules. That is, the government cannot change the tax system once it
is determined in the initial period. We are assuming that such commitment is not
only possible, but perhaps unavoidable, due to political deadlock over the issue of
tax policy, as in the US right now.2 Thus, we may interpret our planner’s problem
1See Kocherlakota (2010) for an overview of this literature.
2Indeed, the US government has not changed its income tax system in a major way since 1986.
The Japanese government is more flexible, but it has not changed its income tax system in a major
way since 2007. Therefore, once the tax systems are fixed, they persist for some time.
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on a politician’s short time-scale. Although our assumptions might be extreme,
we believe that it is important and useful to have a sense about what the optimal
dynamic income tax looks like when the set of tax systems is limited to ones that
are feasible in practice.
We consider a finite horizon model in which the government would like to
maximize the equal weight utilitarian social welfare function. Our economy is
heterogeneous because we fix the type distribution in the initial period.3 Peo-
ple receive idiosyncratic shocks in each period that are i.i.d. among people but
otherwise, the stochastic structure is general.4 Regarding intertemporal resource
allocation, we assume that the government can save or borrow from an outside
party so that it considers a single aggregate resource constraint. However, we show
that the sluggish government cannot allow agents to save or borrow at all because
allowing them to save or borrow requires the government to look at histories.
Although the analytical characterizations and even numerical analysis of the
optimal dynamic tax systemare dicult in general, we can analytically characterize
the optimal tax system because our problem can be reduced to a static one due to
the sluggishness of the government.5 Specifically, this is because under a sluggish
government, the tax rule depends on only the current income and the individual
saving or borrowing is not allowed, so we can regard an agent living for T periods
as distinct agents in each period and for each shock. Therefore, we can directly
apply the arguments for static models to our model.
A famous result in the static optimal income taxation is that the top marginal
3If we do not fix it, the model has identical agents facing uncertainty, which is like a macro
model. However, as long as we consider the equal weight utilitarian social welfare function, the
distinction is not essential for the optimal tax rule as Farhi and Werning (2013) illustrate.
4In particular, the initial type and subsequent shocks can be correlated for each agent.
5Naturally, gaining tractability in this waywidens the analytical insights about optimal dynamic
income taxation we could derive. For example, if we assumed the quasi-linear utility, we could
conduct comparative static analysis as in Weymark (1987).
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tax rate is zero. That is, the top earner’s marginal tax rate is zero. However, we cast
doubt on its policy relevance. In our dynamic stochastic economy, the support of
types will move over time, and a direct application of the static arguments implies
that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of the expanded type space, or the union
of supports over time. Thus, if the largest value of the shock is positive, the zero
top marginal tax result would apply only when the top earner in the initial period
receives the largest possible value of shock in every period. One can argue that the
fraction of people to which the zero top marginal tax rate result applies (i.e., the
top earners) is negligible in static models. However, our result is much stronger
than this. Indeed, whereas someone certainly faces the zero marginal tax rate in
most static models anyway, it is not true in our dynamic, stochastic model. In fact,
no one faces the zero marginal tax rate almost surely.
Our tax rule is stationary and therefore depends on only current income, so it
would be a simple one in the literature. At the other extreme, Farhi and Werning
(2013) , Battaglini andCoate (2008), andKocherlakota (2005) study themost general
rule by considering nonstationary tax rules that depend on the history of income.
Whereas the stochastic structureof the shock is general inKocherlakota (2005), Farhi
andWerning (2013) andBattaglini andCoate (2008) considerMarkov processes.6 In
the middle, Albanesi and Sleet (2006) study a nonstationary tax rule that depends
on only current income when the shock is i.i.d. See Table 1 for a comparison
between our work and others’ work.7
6On the other hand, whereas Kocherlakota (2005) does not consider the time-consistency of a
tax system, Battaglini and Coate (2008) provide conditions under which their tax system is time-
consistent. In a two-period deterministic environment, Berliant and Ledyard (2014) study a tax rule
that is nonstationary and depends on history while addressing time-consistency.
7In a two-period deterministic environment, Gaube (2010) compares three types of nonstationary
income taxation: a tax rule depends on history and the resulting tax system is time-consistent; a tax
rule depends on history but the resulting tax system is not time-consistent; and a tax rule depends
on only current income (but can change over time).
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Table 1: The position of this paper in the literature
Shock History Stationary Commitment
Farhi and Werning (2013) Markov Yes No Yes
Battaglini and Coate (2008) Markov Yes No Yes/No
Kocherlakota (2005) General Yes No Yes
Albanesi and Sleet (2006) i.i.d. No No Yes
This paper General No Yes Yes
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we state the basic
structure of the model, present our problem, and characterize the second-best tax
rule. Section 3 contains our conclusions and discusses subjects for future research.
Proofs omitted from the main text are provided in an Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a finite horizon model with a unit mass of agents. The economy
lasts for T + 1 periods. In period 0, each agent is endowed with type w 2 W0  R++
distributedwith density function fw. However, there are idiosyncratic shocks to the
agents’ types in the subsequent periods. At the beginning of period 1, an element
of zT = fztgTt=1 2 ZT is drawn for agent with type w according to a density function
f (zT jw). We assume thatW0 andZ  R are (non-degenerate) closed intervals. Note
that, although shocks for all T periods are drawn in the initial period, the agent
only learns them as time goes on, so that in period t the agent observes the history
(w; z1; :::; zt). If an agent is endowed with type w in the initial period, his type will
change towt  t(w; zT) in period t. For example, if we consider a linear technology,
t(w; zT) = w +
Pt
s=1 zs. We assume that t(  ;  ) is continuously dierentiable and
for any w 2 W0, t(w; zT) > 0 for all zT 2 ZT in any period. Moreover, we assume
5
Wt 1\Wt , ; for any t  1whereWt is the range oft(  ;  ).8 As long ast(w; 0) = w,
0 2 Z is sucient for this. Finally, we assume that the draws are i.i.d. among agents
and the law of large numbers holds.9 Thus, letting f (zT;w) = f (zT jw) fw(w), the joint
density of zT and w, denote the density of agents having type w in the initial period
and getting shock zT.
The agents supply labor and consume the good produced under constant re-
turns to scale in each period. As is usual in optimal taxation models, they face a
trade-o between consumption and leisure. The utility function is
U

fct; `tgTt=0

=
TX
t=0
tu(ct; `t) (1)
where ` 2 [0; 1] is labor, c is consumption, and  > 0 is the discount factor. We
assume that u(c; `) is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly concave, increasing
in c, and decreasing in `. Moreover, we assume that leisure 1   ` is a noninferior
good.10 In our model, type represents the earning ability of agents. That is, if the
labor supply of agent w is `, his gross income is given by y = w`.
We suppose that there is a risk-free bond market with the interest rate R > 0
where b is the bond holding. Then, letting  be a (lump-sum) component of an
income tax, agents’ budget constraint in period t is
ct + bt+1 = yt   t + (1 + R)bt: (2)
8Because the range of t is in R, t is continuous, andW0  ZT is connected and compact,Wt is
a closed interval. We further assume thatWt is non-degenerate.
9Kocherlakota (2005), for example, also makes these assumptions. Regarding the law of large
numbers, there are some technical issues for the case of continuum of i.i.d. random variables (Judd,
1985). However, Sun (2006) provides a solution to this issue by presenting a probability space in
which the law of large numbers holds.
10Hellwig (2007) presents another assumption that is a cardinal property of u instead of the
assumption that leisure is a noninferior good, which is an ordinal property.
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The government would like to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we
consider the following utilitarian social welfare function:
SW =
Z
W0
Z
ZT
U

fct; yt=wtgTt=0

f (zT;w)dzTdw: (3)
Since the one-period utility function is strictly concave and leisure is a noninferior
good, it follows that redistribution is desirableunder theutilitarianwelfare function
(Seade, 1982). The planner would like to carry out redistribution through income
taxes, but he cannot observe the agents’ types. Thus, the government needs to
design a mechanism that makes the agents reveal their true types.
We consider a direct mechanism in which agents report their types and the
government specifies the combination of consumption c, gross income y, and
bond holding b for each report in each period. Specifically, we call xt(  ) 
(ct(  ); yt(  ); bt+1(  )) an allocation rule. In general, the rule could be nonstationary and
depend on histories of reports as in Battaglini and Coate (2008). However, because
our planner is sluggish, he cannot enforce nonstationary tax rules. Moreover, as a
consequence, he looks at only current reports, because the domain of his tax rule
must be time-dependent if he looks at history. Therefore, we restrict our attention
to the allocation rule that is time-invariant (i.e., xt(  ) = x(  ) for all t) and does not
depend onhistory (or it depends on only the current report).11 For example, if agent
reports wt in period t, his allocation in that period is x(wt) = (c(wt); y(wt); b(wt)).
Although we have included bond holding in the mechanism above, there is
an important result regarding to what extent the sluggish government can control
individual saving or borrowing. Note that, as far as a sluggish government is
concerned, the tax rule, which is induced by an allocation rule via (2), also must
11We note that the government is aware that it is sluggish, so once it chooses its allocation rule, it
knows the rule cannot be changed, and accounts for this when choosing the rule.
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be stationary and history-independent. However, this will imply that the sluggish
government cannot allow saving or borrowing:
Proposition 1. Suppose that Wt is a non-degenerate closed interval and Wt+1 \Wt , ;
for any t  0. Then, the sluggish government cannot allow agents to save or borrow. That
is, b(w) = 0 for all w 2 W  STt=0Wt.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The logic behind this result is pretty
simple. Suppose that, in period t   1, there are agents having types wt 1 and
w0t 1 respectively, and both of them become type wt in period t. By the budget
constraint, the period-t tax on the agent who changes from wt 1 to wt is (wt) =
y(wt)   c(wt)   b(wt) + (1 + R)b(wt 1). Because the government is sluggish, the tax
on the agent who changes from w0t 1 to wt is also (wt), but the budget constraint
implies that (wt) = y(wt)   c(wt)   b(wt) + (1 + R)b(w0t 1). Thus, we must have
b(wt 1) = b(w0t 1). Then, because b(wT) = 0 by the terminal condition, we obtain
the result by induction. Note that this argument does not depend on the utility
function. In particular, Proposition 1 holds regardless of people’s risk attitude (i.e.,
whether they are risk-neutral or risk-averse).12
There are two remarks. First, because our revenue constraint is integrated over
time as we will see, the government can save and borrow for the agents. However,
the sluggishness of government leaves no room for saving and borrowing not
because the government borrows and saves for the consumers, but because it
cannot actually address the intertemporal wedge.13 Indeed, Farhi and Werning
(2013) also have a revenue constraint integrated over time, but according to their
simulations, bond holdings are not zero. Second, we can see that the stochastic
12Note that, if we assume people are risk-neutral as in Battaglini and Coate (2008), the utility
function is quasi-linear.
13The intertemporal wedge is related to Euler equation, or intertemporal substitution. See, for
example, Kocherlakota (2004).
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shocks are important for the argument above. Due to the shocks, each state can
be reached by several agents who generally have dierent histories. When the
government would like to address the intertemporal wedge, it is impossible for
the government to take care of these agents’ situations simultaneously due to its
sluggishness.14
It might be more straightforward to consider an indirect mechanism in which
the agents report their incomes and the government specifies income taxes for each
report. However, now that the bond holding cannot be allowed, it readily follows
that Hammond’s (1979) result applies to our problem because, as we will see, our
problem reduces to a static one. That is, characterizing the direct mechanism is
equivalent to designing a tax rule (  ) and letting each agent choose his income yt
and consumption ct = yt   (yt).
In view of Proposition 1, we henceforth drop the bond holding and let x(  ) =
(c(  ); y(  )). Since the planner cannot observe the agents’ types, he faces incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints that require that the agents do not misreport their
types. Let v(x(w0);w) = u(c(w0); y(w0)=w). This is the one-period utility that agent w
obtains when he reports w0. Since the agents report their types in each period, the
IC constraints are imposed in each period. Recall thatWt is the range of t(  ;  ) for
t  1. Then, the IC constraint in the last period is given by
8w 2 WT; v (x(w);w)  v (x(w0);w) for all w0 2 WT: (ICT)
On the other hand, the IC constraint in period t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;T   1g is given by
14Kapicka (2006) studies optimal income taxation in a dynamic, deterministicmodel where people
can allocate their time to human capital investment. Focusing on steady states, the government can
specify (constant) investment levels for each agent even though it is sluggish.
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8w 2 Wt; v(x(w);w) +
X
st+1
s
Z
ZT
max
w˜2Ws
v(x(w˜);ws) f (zT jw)dzT
 v(x(w0);w) +
X
st+1
s
Z
ZT
max
w˜2Ws
v(x(w˜);ws) f (zT jw)dzT for all w0 2 Wt (ICt)
where ws = s(w; zT). Since our mechanism does not depend on history, the re-
port in the current period does not aect the expected continuation payo (i.e.,P
st+1 s
R
ZT
maxw˜2Ws v(x(w˜);ws) f (zT jw)dzT does not depend on the report in period
t). As a result, the IC constraint in period t reduces to
8w 2 Wt; v(x(w);w)  v(x(w0);w) for all w0 2 Wt:
In addition to the IC constraints, the government faces a resource constraint:
it needs to finance G in units of consumption good through the tax. This revenue
could be used for a public good that is fixed in quantity (and thus in cost) or the
public good could enter utility as an additively separable term. We assume that the
government can borrow or save at rate . Then, the government faces the following
resource constraint (RC):
G 
Z
W0
 
y(w)   c(w) fw(w)dw + TX
t=1
t
Z
W0
Z
ZT
 
y(wt)   c(wt) f (zT;w)dzTdw: (RC)
Suppose that an agent is endowed with type w in the initial period. Let
V(x(  );w) =
Z
ZT
U

fc(wt); y(wt)=wtgTt=0

f (zT jw)dzT: (4)
where wt = t(w; zT). This is the expected lifetime utility that the agent obtains by
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reporting truthfully in each period. Then, the planner’s problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W0
V(x(  );w) fw(w)dw
s.t. (RC) and (ICt) for all t:
(5)
For reference, the first-best allocation rule x(  ) maximizes the utilitarian welfare
function subject to the resource constraint only, assuming that the government
knows the type of each agent at each time.
Let W =
ST
t=0Wt. In what follows, we make the following assumption on the
one-period utility function u, in addition to the regularity conditions stated before:
Assumption 1 (Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property: SCP). 8(c; y;w) 2 R2+W,
 wuc(c; y=w)=u`(c; y=w) is increasing in w.15
Here is the key idea of our work. When we solve the problem (5), we exploit
the fact that our mechanism is time-invariant and does not depend on history,
and we consider a time-separable utility function and the utilitarian social welfare
function. Therefore, the problem can be reduced to a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is expanded to
PT
t=0 
t. That is, each person in each period is
considered to be a dierent person in the staticmodel. Utilitarianismwith the time-
separable utility gives us the equivalence. Then, we take the standard approach
for static optimal income taxation problems to solve (5). That is, we consider a
relaxed problem in which the IC constraints are replaced with weaker conditions
and invoke the fact that a solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the
original problem under Assumption 1.16
15This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the consumption good is a normal good. See
p. 182 of Mirrlees (1971).
16This argument crucially depends on the fact that mechanism is static. Otherwise, general
assumptions like the single crossing property that connect the relaxed problem to the original one
are not known (Farhi and Werning, 2013).
11
Before stating our main result, let us summarize the regularity conditions we
have imposed:
Assumption 2 (Regularity conditions).
1. W0  R++ and Z  R are non-degenerate closed intervals;
2. t is continuously dierentiable; for any w 2 W0, t(w; zT) > 0 for all zT 2 ZT in
any period; Wt 1 \Wt , ; and Wt is non-degenerate for any t  1;
3. u(c; `) is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly concave, increasing in c, and
decreasing in `; leisure 1   ` is a noninferior good;
Let w = minW and w = maxW (thus, W = [w;w]). Moreover, recall that
x(  ) is the first-best allocation rule that maximizes social welfare subject to the
resource constraint. Then, the main properties of the planner’s allocation rule are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, (i) x(w)  x(w) for any w 2 Wwith equality
at w = w. If y(w) is strictly increasing at w = w, x(w) = x(w). Moreover, if y(w) > 0,
then x(w)  x(w) for any w 2 (w;w); (ii) 0(y(w)) = 0 and if y(w) is strictly increasing
at w = w, 0(y(w)) = 0. Moreover, if y(w) > 0, then 0(y(w)) 2 (0; 1) for any w 2 W.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Property (i) states that the allocation
is first-best at the top of W and if income is strictly increasing at the bottom of W,
the allocation is also first-best there. In addition, no allocation can be distorted
upward from the first-best allocation and in particular, if income is positive, the
allocation is distorted downward from the first-best allocation in the interior ofW.
Property (ii) states that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of W and if income
is strictly increasing at the bottom ofW, the marginal tax rate is also zero there. On
the other hand, if income is positive, the marginal tax rate is more than 0 but less
then 1 in the interior ofW.
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By Proposition 2, as long as everyone works so that y(w) > 0 for all w 2 W, the
allocation is generally first-best and the marginal tax rate is zero only at the top of
the expanded type space W. For illustration, suppose t(w; zT) = w +
Pt
s=1 zs. Then,
if maxZ > 0, no one’s allocation is generally first-best and no one’s marginal tax rate is
zero in the first T periods nor the last period except when the type of the top earner in the
initial period reaches w = maxW. In practice, it is unlikely that the planner sets the
marginal tax rate at the ex post top to zero because he does so only when the shock
to the top earner in the initial period takes the largest value in every period. One
can argue that the zero top marginal tax result is relevant to only a small fraction of
people (i.e., the top earner) in static model. However, our result is much stronger
than this. Indeed, whereas someone certainly faces the zero marginal tax rate in
a static economy because the top earner necessarily exists, that is not true here.
As in a static model, an agent faces the zero marginal tax rate when he attains the
highest possible income, but this very top earner does not always exist ex post in
our dynamic, stochastic economy.
Moreover, the results above are in sharp contrast with those of Battaglini and
Coate (2008) in which the shock follows a Markov chain over two states (high and
low). In their first-best tax rule, the allocation is distorted only when people’s
type is currently and has always been low. That is, the allocations of agents who
are currently, or have at some point been high types are first-best. Therefore, the
fractionof peoplewhose allocations aredistorted is decreasingover time. However,
their results crucially depend on the following facts: the support of types is fixed
over time, and the tax rule can depend on history. In our model, the support of
typesmoves over time, and the tax rule can depend on only the current income. As
a result, all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.
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3 Conclusion
We considered the optimal dynamic income taxation problem faced by a slug-
gish government that cannot change the tax rule over time. Because of the govern-
ment’s sluggishness, we could reduce our problem to a static one and analytically
characterize the second-best tax rule. We argued that the zero top marginal tax
result is of little importance in practice because it would apply only when the top
earner in the initial period receives the largest value of shock in every period. This
is a probability zero event, so ex post we ensure a positive tax rate for the top type.17
Regarding the sluggishness of the government, we have made an extreme as-
sumption: the government cannot make its tax rule time-dependent and thus its
tax rates cannot be history-dependent at all. It might be more realistic to consider
the situation in which the government can make its tax rule time-dependent or
look at past histories at some cost.
Moreover, because we considered i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks, we could obtain
the single resource constraint by invoking the law of large numbers. Besides the
sluggishness of the government, this was also crucial for our results. In fact, if
the agents face the common aggregate shocks, their types are correlated with each
other, and the analytical approach of this paper will fail to apply. These should be
subjects of future research.
Finally, although we characterized an optimal tax rule, we did not address its
existence. This can probably be proved using the results of Berliant and Page (2001)
for static optimal taxes.
17In this paper, we consider a finite-horizon model. Technically speaking, we use optimal control
theory, so by replacing terminal conditions with transversality conditions, we would be able to
extend both Propositions 1 and 2 to an infinite-horizon model.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We argue by backward induction. First, b(WT) = f0g by the
terminal condition (i.e., in the last period, no one will save and borrowing is not
permitted because people cannot repay). Now, suppose b(Wt) = f0g where t  T,
and let wt 1 2 Wt 1. Without loss of generality, suppose minWt  maxWt 1.
Because Wt \Wt 1 , ;, and Wt and Wt 1 are closed intervals, b(wt 1) = 0 if wt 1 
minWt by assumption. Thus, we assume wt 1 < minWt. Take w0t 1 > wt 1 in a
neighborhood of wt 1 with diameter less than the length of Z. By the Intermediate
Value Theorem, we can take zt; z0t 2 Z such that wt  wt 1 + zt = w0t 1 + z0t  w0t.18
Then, because the sluggish government’s tax can depend on only the current state,
(wt) = y(wt)   c(wt)   b(wt) + (1 + R)b(wt 1) and (wt) = y(wt)   c(wt)   b(wt) + (1 +
R)b(w0t 1), and thus b(wt 1) = b(w
0
t 1). Therefore, b(wt 1) is constant in (the upper
half of) its neighborhood. Because wt 1 (< minWt) is arbitrary and b(wˆt 1) = 0 for
wˆt 1  minWt, it follows that b(Wt 1) = f0g. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that due to the sluggishness of the government, our
problem can be reduced to a static problem and then invoke the results of Hellwig
(2007) who analyzes a static optimal taxation problem under the utilitarian welfare
function. As in Hellwig (2007), we consider a relaxed problem by replacing the IC
constraint with a weaker condition that is called the downward IC constraint:
8w 2 Wt; v (x(w);w)  v (x(w0);w) for all w0 2 fw˜ 2 Wt : w˜  wg : (IC0t)
for each t. Thus, the downward IC constraint takes care of only downward devia-
18Because the diameter of the neighborhood is smaller than the length of Z, w0t 1 + minZ <
wt 1+maxZ. Thus, forwt 2 [w0t 1+minZ;wt 1+maxZ], we can take zt; z0t 2 Z such thatwt = wt 1+zt
and wt = w0t 1 + z
0
t respectively.
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tions. By Lemma 6.2 of Hellwig (2007), x(  ) with nondecreasing c(  ) satisfies (IC0t) if
and only if dv(x(w);w)dw  vw(x(w);w) for all w 2 Wt. Thus, when we solve the problem,
we impose the constraints that c(w) is nondecreasing and dv(x(w);w)dw  vw(x(w);w) on
W =
ST
t=0Wt instead of the downward IC constraints.
Next, we rewrite the welfare function as
Z
W0
V(x(  );w) fw(w)dw
=
Z
W0
2666664v(x(w);w) + TX
t=1
t
Z
ZT
v(x(wt);wt) f (zT jw)dzT
3777775 fw(w)dw
=
Z
W0
v(x(w);w) fw(w)dw +
TX
t=1
t
Z
Wt
v(x(wt);wt) ft(wt)dwt
where ft(w) =
R
ZT
f (zT;  1t (w; z
T))d
 1
t (w;z
T)
dw dz
T. Let fw be an extension of fw toW (i.e.,
fw(w) = fw(w) on W0 and fw(w) = 0 on W nW0). Similarly, let ft be an extension of
ft toW. Then, the above expression reduces to
Z
W
v(x(w);w)g(w)dw (6)
where g(w)  fw(w) +PTt=1 t ft(w). Likewise, the resource constraint is reduced to
G 
Z
W
(w)g(w)dw: (7)
Therefore, our relaxed problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W
v(x(w);w)g(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W
(w)g(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and dv(x(w);w)dw  vw(x(w);w) on W:
(8)
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On the other hand, Hellwig (2007) considers a standard static optimal taxation
problem. Specifically, in our notations, his problem is written as
max
x(  )
Z
W0
v(x(w);w) fw(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W0
(w) fw(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and dv(x(w);w)dw  vw(x(w);w) on W0:
(9)
Hence, we can see that our problem can be viewed as a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is
PT
t=0 
t, the support of type distribution isW, and the welfare
weight for type w is g(w), and therefore, the arguments of Hellwig (2007) directly
apply. In particular, the property (i) follows from Theorem 6.1 and the property (ii)
from Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 of Hellwig (2007). 
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